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I. International Law Applicable to
a Visiting Force and its Members
in the Absence of Specific Agreements
The narrow question whether, in the absence of international agree-
ments, such as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA)
and similar treaties, the host (receiving) State or the visiting force (sending
State) has the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the
visiting force has been discussed in numerous law review articles.' How-
ever, the broader question of what the international law is on the entire
relationship between the host nation and a visiting force in the absence of
such agreements or, stated differently, on subjects not covered by provi-
sions of such agreements as NATO SOFA, has received little attention. In
*Tulane Law School (LL.M., 1941) and Harvard Law School (LL.M., 1942); member,
the Bars of the District of Columbia, U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Military
Appeals; instructor in Anglo-American law at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, and
instructor in international law, business law and labor law at the University of Maryland
(European Division). Dr. Schwenk has published numerous leading law review articles in
such law reviews as Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Tulane Law Review, Michigan
Law Review, Virginia Law Review, etc.
1Rouse & Baldwin, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction under the NA TO Status of
Forces Agreement, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 29-62 (1957); Baxter, Jurisdiction over Visiting
Forces and-the Development of International Law, AM. J. INT'L L. Proceedings, 1958,
174- 180, 18 1- 199; Baxter, Criminal Jurisdiction in the NA TO Status of Forces Agreement,
7 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 72 (1958); Orfield, Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts over Crimes Com-
mitted Abroad by American Military Personnel, 8 S.C.L.Q. 346 (1956) Re, NA TO Status of
Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw. U.L.REV. 349 (1955); Schwartz, In-
ternational Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1091
(1953); Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 380 (1949); Barton, Foreign Arted Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 186 (1950); Schwelb, Status of U.S. Forces in English Law, 38
AM.J. INT'L L. 50 (1944); Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1957).
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more specific terms, the question arises whether in the absence of such
provisions the visiting force as well as its members are subject to the
"jurisdiction" of the host nation.
Thus, for example, the host nation may claim, by virtue of its police
power, the authority to enjoin the visiting force from polluting air or water,
or from the continued use of training areas on the ground that they are
unsafe, because of alleged lack of safety, or from maintaining its own
schools for dependents or from practising medicine without a license of the
host country, etc. The term "jurisdiction" is one of the most ambiguous
terms in Anglo-American law.
2
a. The Status of the Visiting Force
1. Whether or not, in the absence of provisions of international agree-
ments covering the subject, the visiting force is subject to the civil jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the host nation depends on whether the Government
of the sending State, of which the force is an integral part, may successfully
assert the defense of sovereign immunity from suit. Even though the
question of immunity from suit is a matter of international law and the
answer should, therefore, be uniform, the fact remains that States such as
Great Britain 3 and Turkey 4 still adhere to the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity, whereas numerous other States have adopted the so-called re-
strictive theory. 5
Therefore, the question whether the sending State may successfully
resort to the defense of sovereign immunity from suit, depends on whether
the host nation's courts adhere to the absolute or restrictive theory of
immunity and, in the latter case, how the courts of the host nation dis-
tinguish between acts "jure imperii" and acts "jure gestionis." 6 In some
countries the question of the defense of sovereign immunity has been
eliminated by special agreements, e.g., in connection with offshore procure-
ment. 7
2 EHRENZWEIG & LOUISELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL (1964), p. 7: "The student
already must clearly perceive that the word 'jurisdiction' covers a multitude of ideas. It is
indeed a chameleonic word, a cloak of many colors."
3Compania Naviera Vascongada v. Christina (1938) A.C. 458; Dollfus Meig et Cie v.
Bank of England (1950) 1 Ch. 333; Duff Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan (1924)
A.C. 797; Kahan v. Federation of Pakistan (195 1) 2 K.B. 1003.4TEKS Insaat ve Sanayi Ltd. and Byrne International Inc, v. United States, No. 68/921
(High Court of Cassation, Commercial Division, 16 Feb. 1968).5Schwenk, Immunity of the United States from*Suits Abroad, 45 MIL. L. REV. 30
(1969).6Supra note 5, at 3 1.7Robert S. Pasley, Offshore Procurement, MIL. L. REV., October 1962 (DA Pam
27-100-18, I October 1962) (page 55).
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2. The defense of immunity from suit is a matter of adjective law.
However, the question remains whether, in carrying out its activities, the
visiting force is subject to the substantive law of the host nation. As
mentioned above, the visiting force constitutes an integral part of the
Government of the sending State. The activities of the Government in a
foreign country are immune from the substantive law of the receiving State
only to the extent provided by customary international law or treaty. 8
b. The Status of Members of the Visiting Force
The question whether members of the force are subject to the court
jurisdiction of the host nation must be divided into two parts: civil court
jurisdiction and criminal court jurisdiction.
1. As far as the civil court jurisdiction of the host nation is concerned,
there appears to be little doubt that a member of the force may sue or be
sued in the courts of the host nation, depending on their jurisdiction over
the subject matter and person under local law.
2. A more serious question arises with regard to the criminal court
jurisdiction of the host nation over members of the visiting force. At the
time when NATO SOFA was considered by the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the US Senate, 83d Congress, 1st Session, Senator Bricker
expressed the view that the members of the visiting force were not subject
8Article 23, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, provides:
I. The sending State and the head of the mission shall. be exempt from all national,
regional .or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, whether
owned or leased, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.
2. The exemption from taxation referred to in this Article shall not apply to such dues
and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the
sending State or the head of the mission.
Article 28 provides:
The fees and charges levied by the mission in the course of its official duties shall be
exempt from all dues and taxes.
Article 34 provides:
A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national,
regional or municipal, except:
(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in the price of goods or
services:
(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purpose of the
mission;
(c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 39;
(d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and
capital taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State;
(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
(f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to
immovable property, subject to the provisions of Article 23.
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to the criminal court jurisdiction of the receiving State. 9 He relied on
Colonel Archibald King's two famous law review articles. 10 Colonel King
in turn invoked primarily the case of the Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon.11
Contrary to the position taken by Senator Bricker, the State Department
endeavored to prove that the members of the visiting force were subject to
the criminal jurisdiction of the host nation. A memorandum prepared by
the U.S. Department of Justice and entitled "International Law and the
Status of Forces Agreement" 12 reached the conclusion that the receiving
State had jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the forces of
the sending State. The Department of Justice pointed out that the Schoon-
er Exchange case did not involve a question of criminal jurisdiction, and
relied on a number of "cases in the tribunals of the world."1' 3 Senator
Bricker's 1 4 reply to the Department of Justice's memorandum was that
paragraph 12 of the US Courts Martial Manual, 1951, provided:
Under international law, jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces of
the United States or other sovereign who commit offenses in the territory of a
friendly foreign state in which the visiting armed force is by consent quar-
tered or in passage remains in the visiting sovereign.
The dispute between Senator Bricker and the Department of Justice
ended when the Senate gave its advice and consent to the NATO SOFA
and the President of the United States ratified NATO SOFA. However,
upon ratification of NATO SOFA, the question arose whether NATO
SOFA could provide for jurisdiction of the receiving State over offenses
committed within its borders by members of the sending State. This ques-
tion was settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Wilson v. Girard,' 5 and by the U.S. District Court of the District of
Columbia in the case of Smallwood v. Clifford.16
The thrust of the two decisions is that, as a matter of international law,
the host nation is vested with jurisdiction over members of the visiting
"Congressional Record-Senate-July 14, 1953, p. 9036.
1°King, Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 AM. J. INT'I_ L. 539
(1942): King, Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed
Forces, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1946).
"Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (Cranch) 116, 32 Ed. 287 (18 12).
2Supplementary Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 24,
1953, at p. 49.
131d., at p. 5 I.
141d., at p. 56.
15Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), noted 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 794 (1957), 71 HARV.
L. REV. 140 (1957), 18 I-A. L. REV. 173 (1957), 42 MINN. L. REV. 825 (1958), 19 OHiO ST.
L.J. 143 (1958), 32 ST. JOHN'S L.R. 117 (1957), 43 VA. L. REV. 939 (1957). See also, Re,
Status of Forces Agreement: The American Experience, 35 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 306, 316
(1961).
16Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (1968).
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force, unless it expressly or impliedly agreed to surrender its jurisdiction.
In the Girard case the U.S. Supreme Court failed to take issue with the
dictum of the Schooner Exchange case, to the effect that "the grant of free
passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their
passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline, and to inflict
those punishments which the government of his army may require."
However, the conclusion reached in the Girard and Smallwood cases
appears to be in accord with general principles of international law under
which, as a matter of principle, the host State normally has exclusive
jurisdiction over all things and persons within its own territory. 17 In the
past there existed only one exception to this principle: a number of West-
ern Powers developed a system of "extraterritorial jurisdiction" which
entitled the resident citizens of those Western Powers to be subject to the
laws of their own governments and to be tried, if accused of offenses, by
diplomatic or consular courts operated by, and under the laws of the
Western States in question. 18 This system was based in part on custom and
in part on special bilateral treaties, so-called "capitulations." In time, each
of the States affected managed either to abrogate unilaterally or by agree-
ment, these encroachments on its territorial sovereignty.
I. Article II, NATO SOFA (Respect for Local Law)
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement 19 appears to dispose of the
problem of over-all jurisdiction of the receiving State by virtue of Article
I1. The English text of the first sentence of Article 1I provides:
It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members thereof
as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State....
The French text of Article 1I, NATO SOFA,-which according to the
concluding paragraph of NATO SOFA is equally authoritative,-reads:
Les membres d'une force ou d'un 6lment civil, ainsi que les personnes s leur
charge sont tenus de respecter les lois en vigueur dans I'Etat de s~jour....
The two texts are not identical. Whereas the English text provides for a
duty of "a force and the members thereof as well as their dependents" to
respect the law of the receiving State, the French text limits the duty to
"members of a force or of a civilian component and their dependents." The
question then arises which version is correct.
17Prugh, The Soviet Status of Forces Agreements: Legal Limitations or Political De-
vices? MIL. L. REv., April 1963 (D.A. Pam. 27-100-20, 1 April 1963).
1 8Hyde, International Law, Vol. 11, pp. 849-871; Hackworth, Digest of International
Law, Vol. I1, pp. 493-621; Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. Il,pp. 593-755.
19Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Force, June 19, 1951 (T.I.A.S. 2846; 4 U.S.T. 1792; 199 U.N.T.S. 67).
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Unfortunately, the available background material on Article 11 does not
shed any light on the reason for this discrepancy. Assuming the English
version of Article 1I, NATO SOFA, prevails over the French it is ques-
tionable what is meant by the term "respect." It appears at least arguable
that this term requires substantial rather than literal compliance with the
law of the receiving State. If this interpretation is correct, the visiting force
will have to pay in substance, and in substance only, due respect to local
traffic law, water law, building regulations, health and sanitation law, etc.,
unless there are special provisions in either NATO SOFA 20 or implement-
ing agreements 21 to the contrary.
III. Article VII, Paragraphs 1 to 9,
NATO SOFA (Criminal Jurisdiction)
Paragraphs I to 9 of Article VII, NATO SOFA, contain the criminal
jurisdiction provisions. In order to alleviate the hardship resulting from the
fact under the provisions of Article VII, NATO SOFA, American soldiers
may be tried in foreign courts and under foreign law, the Senate adopted,
by way of resolution, certain "reservations" 22 in giving its advice and
consent to the NATO Status of Forces Agreements.
The impact of "reservations" to multilateral agreements has been a
20E.g., Art. Il , NATO SOFA, exempting members of the force from local passport and
visa regulations and immigration inspection on entering or leaving the territory of a receiving
State, as well as from the regulations of the receiving State on the registration and control of
aliens; Article X exempting members of a force, or civilian component, from taxation in the
receiving State on the salary and emoluments paid to them as such members by the sending
State, or on any tangible movable property the presence of which in the receiving State is due
solely to their temporary presence there.
21E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Supplementary Agreement to the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement with the Protocol of Signature to the Supplementary
Agreement (T.I.A.S. 5351 14 U.S.T. 53 1; 481 U.N.T.S. 5262), and numerous special agree-
ments on subjects such as "the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States of America, on the Settlement of Disputes Arising out of Direct Procurement"
(T.I.A.S. 5352; 14 U.S.T. 689,490 U.N.T.S. 30), Agreement on the Status of Persons on
Leave (T.I.A.S. 5352; 14 U.S.T. 689; 490 U.N.T.S. 36), etc.
221n giving its advice and consent to ratification, it is the sense of the Senate that:
I. The criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII do not constitute a precedent for
future agreements;
2. Where a person subject to the military jurisdiction of the United States is to be tried
by the authorities of a receiving State, under the treaty the Commanding Officer of the
armed forces of the United States in such state shall examine the laws of such state with
particular reference to the procedural safeguards contained in the Constitution of the
United States;
3. If, in the opinion of such commanding officer, under all the circumstances of the case,
there is danger that the accused will not be protected because of the absence or denial of
constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States, the commanding officer shall
request the authorities of the receiving state to waive jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3(c) of Article VII (which requires the receiving state to give
'sympathetic consideration' to such request) and if such authorities refuse to waive
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controversial matter in international law. 23 It formed the subject of an
opinion of the International Court of Justice. 24 Since it appears that the
Senate's Reservations to the NATO SOFA were not intended to alter its
provisions, they are purely of a municipal nature and, therefore, not dis-
tinguishable from the Reservations to the "Treaty between the United
States and Canada Concerning Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River"
of February 27, 195025 involved in the case of Power Authority of Nell,
York v. Federal Power Commission.26 The Department of Defense imple-
mented the Senate's Reservations by DOD Directive 5525.1, dated 20
February 1966 (Status of Force Policies and Information) and AR 27-50,
dated 27 May 1966.27
jurisdiction, the commanding officer shall request through diplomatic channels and notifi-
cation shall be given by the Executive Branch to the Armed Services Committees of the
Senate and House of Representatives;
4. A representative of the United States to be appointed by the Chief of Diplomatic
Mission with the advice of the senior United States military representative in the receiv-
ing state will attend the trial of any such person by the authorities of a receiving state
under the agreement, and any failure to comply with the provisions of paragraph 9 of
Article VII of the agreement shall be reported to the commanding officer of the armed
forces of the United States in such state who shall then request the Department of State
to take appropriate action to protect the rights of the accused, and notification shall be
given by the Executive Branch to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives.
235 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 101-53 (1943); MILLER, RESERVATIONS TO
TREATIES (1919); Anderson, Ratification of Treaties with Reservations, 13 AM. J. INT'L L.
526 (1919); Bishop, Reservations to Treaties, Hague Academy of International Law, 103
Recueil des Cours 243-321 (1962); Fitzmaurice, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 2
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. I (1953); Harvard Research in International Law, Treaties, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 843-912 (Supp. 1935); Lauterpacht, Some Possible Solutions to the Problems of
Reservations to Treaties, 39 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'y 97 (1954); Malkin, Reservations to
Multilateral Conventions, 7 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 141 (1926); Meek, International Law:
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 38 YALE L.J. 1086 (1929); Sanders, Reservations to
Multilateral Treaties, Made in the Act of Ratification or Adherence, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 488
(1939).24Advisory Opinion on Reservations, (1951) I.C.J. Rep. 15 (1951); 45 AM. J. INT'L L.
579 (1951): The General Assembly of the United Nations had sought an opinion as to
ratification of the Genocide Convention. See also Yuen-li Liang, The Third Session of the
International Law Commission: Review of its Work by the General Assembly- 1, 46 AM. J.
INT'L L. 483- 503 (1952) for a detailed analysis of the opinion.25Treaty Relating to Uses of Waters of the Niagara River (T.I.A.S. 2130; I U.S.T. 694;
132 U.N.T.S. 223).26Power Authority of the State of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 101 U.S.
App. D.C. 132, 247 F.2d 538 (1957) (D.C. Cir.), remanded with direction to dismiss as moot,
355 U.S. 64 (1957).27Part IV A (Procedures) of the Directive and part 3 of AR 27-50 provide:
It is intended to provide herein, inter alia, for the implementation of the Senate
Resolution accompanying the Senate's consent to ratification of the Status of Forces
Agreement (Appendix Y). Although the Senate Resolution applies only in countries
where the NATO Status of Forces Agreement is currently in effect, the same procedures
for safeguarding the interests of United States personnel subject to foreign jurisdiction
will be applied insofar as practicable in all overseas areas where United States forces are
regularly stationed.
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It should be noted that the Senate provided in the First Reservation that
the criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII did not constitute a
precedent for future agreements. It should be further noted that under the
Second Reservation the Commanding Officer of the armed forces of the
United States shall examine the laws of the receiving State, with particular
reference to the procedural safeguards contained in the Constitution of the
United States, i.e., that the Commander in Chief, through his Judge Advo-
cate, must prepare what is known as a "country study."
In such a "country study," he must compare the constitutional rights the
accused would enjoy in the United States with equivalent rights the ac-
cused will enjoy in the receiving State, in order to determine whether there
is a danger that the accused will not be protected because of the absence or
denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States. It is
generally assumed that the constitutional rights referred to in the Senate
Reservations are-those granted in State courts. However, those rights have
been under a constant flux. Thus, in recent years the U.S. Supreme Court
extended the rights of the accused in State trials by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment to: (1) Rights to speedy trial; 28 (2) Effective repre-
sentation by counsel; 29 (3) Privilege against self-incrimination;3 0 (4) Ex-
clusionary rule of evidence; 31 (5) Right to confrontation with witnesses;3 2
(6) Right to trial by jury;33 (7) Prohibition of double jeopardy.3 4
Also, in determining the procedural safeguards of an accused under the
local law of foreign NATO countries, due attention must be given to the
European Human Rights Convention,3 5 which contains a number of proce-
dural safeguards of an accused in Articles 5,36 6, 37 and 7.38 The European
28Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
29Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963):
Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Burgett v.
Texas, 38 U.S. 109 (1967).
"
0Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.5 . 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York,
378 U.S. 52 (1964). As to the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Boyd v.
U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1885); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).31Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See
also 30 A.L.R., 3d 128 (Annotation).32Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). For subsequent cases, see Right to Confront
Witnesses in 23 L. ED. 2d 861.33Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
34Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).35Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
November 1950, amended by Five Protocols. For the text of the Convention, see 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 24-39 (Supp. 1951). For a discussion, see Coblentz and Warshaw, European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 44 CAL. L. REV.
94 (1956); Schindler, The European Convention on Human Rights in Practice, 1962 WASH.
U.L.Q. 152; Triska, Individual and His Rights in the European Community, 31 TUL. L. REV.
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283 (1957); Waldock, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 54 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 356 (1958).36Article 5 of the European Human Rights Convention provides:
(1) Everyone has right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of this
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order
of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
offence or lleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision
or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to
deportation or extradition.
(2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph I(c) of
this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
(4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
(5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
37Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention provides:
(I) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or for any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence:
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests
of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him:
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.
38Article 7 of the European Human Rights Convention provides:
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Human Rights Convention has been ratified by all members of the Europe-
an Council, except France and Switzerland, namely by the following 16
countries: Austria, Belgium (NATO), Denmark (NATO), Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (NATO), Great Britain (NATO), Cyprus (except as to
individual complaint and Human Rights Court), Greece (NATO), Iceland
(NATO), Ireland, Italy (NATO), Luxembourg (NATO), Malta, The Neth-
erlands (NATO), Norway (NATO), Sweden, Turkey (NATO).
In comparing two different systems of law, one should not jump to
conclusions, but remember what two distinguished lawyers said in an
enlightening law review article: 39
One further observation should be made. The student should not hasten to
the conclusion that, because differences are found to exist between the
procedures of two nations, that necessarily means-or even probably
means-a different result will be reached in a criminal prosecution by one
sovereign rather than by the other.
The Third Reservation imposes on the Commanding Officer the duty to
request the authorities of the receiving States to waive jurisdiction in
accordance with paragraph 3(a) of Article VIl[, NATO SOFA, only if, in
his opinion, "under all circumstances of the case," there is danger that the
accused will not be protected because of the absence or denial of con-
stitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States.
Thus, the absence or denial of constitutional rights the accused would
enjoy in the United States by itself is not the decisive factor. Instead, it is
only such absence or denial of constitutional rights which would bring
about the danger that the accused will not be protected. In other words, the
fact that a constitutional right prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, does not or not fully exist under
the system of foreign law must be weighed against other circumstances
which might outbalance this shortcoming. Thus, for example, a con-
stitutional right which under the adversary system of the common law may
be absolutely essential to a fair trial may not be absolutely vital to the
investigatory system of the civil law.
Finally, it should be noted from the Fourth Reservation of the Senate
Resolution, that a trial observer must be appointed to attend the trial of a
(I) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
(2) This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
3 9Joseph M. Snee & A. Kenneth Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure: A Com-
parison of Two Systems, 21 OHIo L.J. 467, 473 (1960).
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member of the force, civilian component, or dependent in a foreign court,
in order to ascertain whether a local court, when trying a member of the
force, civilian component, or dependent, fails to comply with paragraph 9
of Article VII, NATO SOFA, which prescribes a number of safeguards 40
a foreign court must observe in trying a member of a force, civilian
component, or dependent.
One of the safeguards set forth in paragraph 9 of Article VII, NATO
SOFA is the right to prompt and speedy trial. This provision emanates
from the Constitution of the United States. 41 A similar provision is con-
tained in the European Human Rights Convention. 42 However, it is a
different question whether a violation of the right to prompt and speedy
trial has the same effect under the local law of foreign NATO countries as
it has in the United States, namely, dismissal of the charges.
Thus, for example, the German Supreme Court 43 held that a failure of
the German courts to comply with the prompt and speedy trial provision of
paragraph 9 of Article VII, NATO SOFA, does not have any legal con-
sequences, since no sanction has been provided in Article VII, NATO
SOFA, or in the corresponding provision of the European Human Rights
Convention. However, a lower German court ruled recently to the con-
trary .44
In order to ascertain whether the sending State has exclusive or con-
current jurisdiction over a particular offense, it is necessary to determine
whether an offense under the UCMJ constitutes also an offense under local
law and vice versa. Thus, exclusive jurisdiction of local courts exists over
40Para. 9 of Art. VII, NATO SOFA provides:
Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under
the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled-(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him; (d) to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own for his defence or to have free or assisted legal
representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State; (f)
if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and (g) to
communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when the
rules of the court permit to have such a representative present at this trial.
41Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to state trials by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment according to Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) and
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).42Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention. See note 37, supra.
43Judgment of the German Supreme Court of 12 July 1966 in the case of PFC Earl Small
(Decisions of the German Supreme Court in: Criminal Cases, Vol. 2 1, p. 81). Schwenk, Das
Recht des Beschuldigten auf alsbaldige Hauptverhandlung, published in 79 Zeitschrift fiir die
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 722- 740 (1967).
44judgment of the Landgericht Frankfurt/Main of 5 Nov. 1970, published in issue no. 7
of "Juristenzeitung" 197 1, pp. 234- 236.
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members of the civilian component and dependents in peacetime due to the
fact that the U.S. Supreme Court held in the case of Reid v. Covert45 that
courts-martial lack peacetime jurisdiction over them.
Whether the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of
O'Callahan v. United States46 denying jurisdiction to courts-martial over
non-service connected offenses, results in exclusive jurisdiction of local
courts over such offenses in a NATO country, has not yet been determined
by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, in deciding the case of United
States v. Keaton,47 the United States Court of Military Appeals held, by
obiter dictum, that the constitutional limitation on court-martial jurisdiction
laid down in O'Callahan v. Parker is inapplicable to court-martial held
outside the territorial limits of the United States.
IV. Article VIII, NATO SOFA (Claims)
Another provision of NATO SOFA implemented by local law is Article
VIII, the provision dealing with claims against the force of the sending
State. Article VIII provides for two kinds of claims, namely:
(I) Scope claims dealt with in paragraph 5 of Article Vi1i; and
(2) Non-scope claims (so-called ex gratia claims) dealt with in para-
graph 6 of Article VIII, NATO SOFA.
Scope claims are divided into two kinds:
(a) Claims arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force or
civilian component done in the performance of official duty; and
(b) Claims arising out of any other act, omission or occurrence for
which a force or civilian component is legally responsible.
Whereas the claims under (a) refer to acts or omissions of members of a
force or civilian component (but not dependents) done in the performance
of official duty, the claims under (b) pertain to acts, omissions or occur-
rences of a force or civilian component as such, and such claims under (b)
arise only if the force or civilian component "is legally responsible."
45Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (dependents); Kinsella v.
United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (dependent); Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)
(civilian employee); McElroy v. U.S. 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian employee); see Schuck,
Trial of Civilian Personnel by Foreign Courts, 2 MIL. L. REV. (D.A. Pam 27- 100-2, Septem-
ber 1958) 37, and Harrison, Court-Martial Jurisdiction of Civilians-A Glimpse at Some
Constitutional Issues, 7 MIL. L. REv. 61 (D.A. Pam 27-100-7, January 1960).
4 6 0'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See also Wurtzel, O'Callahan v. Parker:
Where Are We No,? 56 A.B.A.J. 686 (1970).47 U.S. v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64 (1969) 64 A.J.I.L. 431 (1970); U.S. v. Easter, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 68 (1969) 64 A.J.I.L. 433 (1970); U.S. v. Stevenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 69 (1969);
U.S. v. Higginbotham, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 73 (1969); U.S. v. Gill, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 93 (1969). See
also Gallagher v. U.S., 423 F.2d 1371 (1970) (Court of Claims); 64 A.J.I.L. 959 (1970).
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Whether the force is "legally responsible," is a question of local law.
Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article VIII, NATO SOFA, the
filing of claims, and their consideration and settlement or adjudication
must be done "in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own armed
forces."
The claimant may not only file a claim under local adjective and substan-
tive law, but he may also bring suit against the individual member of the
force or civilian component in the competent local courts. In this case,
NATO SOFA48 provides that "the sending State shall not claim immunity
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State, for members of a
force or civilian component in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the courts
of the receiving State, except to the extent provided in paragraph 5(g) of
Article VIII, NATO SOFA, Paragraph 5(g) of Article VIII, NATO
SOFA, prescribes that "a member of a force or civilian component shall
not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment
given against him in the receiving State in a matter arising from the
performance of his official duties." Consequently, a lawsuit against a mem-
ber of a force or the civilian component in a matter arising from the
performance of his official duties would be a futile exercise.
V. Article IX, Paragraph 3, NATO SOFA (Rights and
Obligations Arising Out of the Occupation or Use of
Buildings, Grounds, Facilities, or Services
The last sentence of paragraph 3 of Article IX, NATO SOFA, pre-
scribes:
In the absence of a specific contract to the contrary, the laws of the receiving
State shall determine the rights and obligations arising out of the occupation
or use of the buildings, grounds, facilities or services.
This provision means that, unless the US Government as a sending
State, has "a specific contract to the contrary," the occupation of buildings
and grounds is governed by local law. The device under local law providing
for the occupation or use of buildings and grounds could be normal leases,
easements, hereditary rights, etc. As far as the use of "services" is con-
cerned, procurement of utlities (water, gas, electricity, garbage collection,
etc.) is likewise governed by local law. Such law may be federal, state or
municipal.
Since the NATO SOFA provisions appear to be self-executing, they
48Para. 9 of art. VIII, NATO SOFA.
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supersede prior conflicting Acts of Congress. 49 The application of local
procurement law may encounter difficulties. Thus, U.S. procurement regu-
lations5" require the use of certain standard clauses, such as the disputes
clause. Under this clause, disputes are determined by the contracting
officer of the U.S. Army and, upon appeal, by the local Board of Contract
Appeals and, upon further appeal, if the amount involved exceeds $50,000,
by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in Washington, D.C. In
all these instances, one of the parties, namely the executive branch of the
U.S. Government, renders the final decision unless determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction to have been "fraudulent,, or capricious, or arbi-
trary, or so grossly erroneous, as necessarily to imply bad faith." Such a
concept of unilateral determination of disputes might be in violation of the
local law of other NATO countries.5 1 Therefore, special agreements with
other NATO countries might provide for the recognition of the disputes
clause.52
VI. Article IX, Paragraph 4, NATO SOFA (Local Labor)
Paragraph 4 of Article IX, NATO SOFA, provides that
... The conditions of employment and work, in particular wages, supple-
mentary payments and conditions for the protection of workers, shall be
those laid down by the legislation of the receiving State....
This Provision deals with the conditions of employment and work of local
labor. Such local labor can be employed by the force either directly (direct
hire) or indirectly (indirect hire). If local labor is directly employed by the
U.S. Forces abroad, the U.S. Government is the employer; 53 if local labor
is indirectly employed, a governmental agency of the receiving State is
responsible for the employment of local labor and its terms and conditions.
However, in both instances, conditions of employment and work are gov-
erned by local law.
This local law encompasses, as a rule, the entire body of local labor law.
Such local labor law might include legislation for the protection of workers
and employees against termination of employment,5 4 for the establishment
49Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
5
°See ASPR 7- 103.
5 1Pasley, Offshore Procurement, MIL. L.REV., October 1962 (D.A. Pam 27-100-18, 1
October 1962) 80-81.52E.g., Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of
America on the Settlement of Disputes arising out of Direct Procurement of 3 August 1959,
op. cit., note 2 1.
5 This is the holding of the German Supreme Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) of 20
December 1957, published in Vol. 5, page 130., of "Entscheidungen des Bun-
desarbeitsgerichts" (Official Decisions of the Supreme Labor Court).
54E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Kiindigungsschfitzgesetz" (Law for the
Protection Against Termination of Employment) of 10 August 1951 (BG BI 1944).
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of works councils, 55 for the protection of pregnant women, 56 for maximum
working hours,5 7 for annual leave, 58 etc. Furthermore, local labor law may
prescribe that employees have a right to work in addition to the right to be
paid. 59
Finally, in case a local employee sues the U.S. in case of direct hire for
breach of contract, the question arises whether such a suit is barred by the
defense of sovereign immunity. The answer to that question depends on
whether the receiving State adheres to the absolute or restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity,60 and in the latter case whether employment of local
labor is considered an act "de jure imperii" (governmental) or "de jure
gestionis" (proprietary).6 1
V11. Conclusion
Even though NATO SOFA attempts to divide jurisdiction in certain
fields over the visiting force between the sending and the receiving State,
certain gaps exist that must be filled by general principles of international
law. An order issued by the government of the receiving State against the
force of the sending State would be incompatible with the sovereignty of
the sending State. Moreover, it would appear that the force of the sending
State retains certain jurisdiction, even though NATO SOFA does not
provide for such jurisdiction.
Thus the force of the sending State may maintain its own schools for its
dependents, despite the fact that compulsory school laws of the receiving
State prescribe that all children must attend the schools of the receiving
State. Physicians of the force may practice medicine, even though they
have no license from the receiving State to do so. Moreover, orders issued
by judicial or administrative agencies of the receiving State against the
55E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Personal-vertretungsgesetz" (Personnel
Representation Law) of 5 August 1955 (BGBI 1477), as modified by Re Article 56, Protocol
of Signature to the Supplementary Agreement regarding the Status of Foreign Forces sta-
tioned in the Federal Republic of Germany.
56E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Mutterschutzgesetz" (Law for the Protec-
tion of Pregnant Women) of 18 April 1968 (BGBI I 315).57E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Arbeitszeitordnung" (Maximum Working
Hours Law) of 30 April 1938 (RGBI 1 447).
58E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Bundesurlaubsgesetz" (Federal Leave
Law) of 8 January 1963 (BGBI 1 2).
59E.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany: Decision of the German Supreme Labor
Court of 10 November 1955, published in Vol. 2, page 217, of "Entscheidungen des Bun-
desarbeitsgerichts" (Official Decisions of the Supreme Labor Court).
600n the distinction between "acts jure imperii" and "acts jure gestionis," see Schwenk,
Immunity of the United States from Suits Abroad, 45 MIL. L. REV. 23, 29 (1969) (DA Pam
27-100-45, 1 July 1969).61Thus, the Italian Supreme Court held, in the case of Bellotto v. United States, on 13
February 1959, that employment of local labor in Italy constitutes an act "dejure gestionis."
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force of the sending State, enjoining alleged breaches of local law, appear
to be repugnant to the sovereignty of the sending State.
Such breaches of local law may either amount to a violation of Article
11, NATO SOFA, or may give rise to a claim under Article VIii, NATO
SOFA. As a result, whereas many questions pertaining to the relationship
between the sending and receiving State have been disposed of by the
provisions of NATO SOFA, numerous questions have been left open and
should be solved either by supplementary agreements or by negotiations on
a case-by-case basis.
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